Science, social critique, and the need for ethics by Woodford, Peter & Carter, Alecia
Animal Sentience 2019.253:  Woodford & Carter on Marino & Merskin on Sheep Complexity 
1 
 
Science, social critique, and the need for ethics 




Department of Religious Studies 
Union College, Schenectady 
 
Alecia Carter 
Institute des Sciences de l’Évolution de Montpellier (ISEM) 
Université de Montpellier, CNRS, IRD, EPHE, Montpellier, France 
 
Abstract:  Marino & Merskin’s target article on the cognitive and psychological capacities of sheep 
commendably aims to use science to critique human practice.  However, the article fails to make 
specific recommendations about how human-sheep relations should change going forward.  We 
also underscore two problematic assumptions highlighted by other commentators: (1) that 
cognitive complexity is important to the case for the moral status of non-human animals and (2) 
that the way humans use and treat animals is caused by our conception of animals’ capacities.  
Scientists should engage more with philosophy and ethical theory to articulate the implications of 
animal capacities for human treatment of animals. 
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Marino & Merskin’s (M&M) (2019) article on the cognitive and psychological capacities of sheep 
is a good illustration of an attempt to use science to critique ideology and human practice. If 
ideology is a view of reality that supports and legitimizes a set of social practices, and indeed hides 
aspects of reality from view that might challenge the moral acceptability of such practices, then 
the notion that sheep are simple-minded, passive, obedient, and dependent — lower beings on 
an ontological scala naturae — might be the ideology that allows those who mistreat sheep to 
sleep at night. In that way, as M&M put it, (recent) historical perceptions of sheep may “fuel and 
sustain contemporary media, popular culture, and farming practices” (p. 16).  
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 M&M hope that their review will lead to “reconsidering the use of sheep as commodities 
in modern agricultural production and in invasive research” (p. 16). However, the nature of this 
reconsideration is left largely vague; and M&M do not outline what an ethical relationship with 
sheep concretely requires.  To do so would require defending an ethical theory and showing how 
it applies in this case, which would benefit from engagement with literature in the field of animal 
ethics. 
 To illustrate this, we point out that M&M’s argument appears to be implicitly abolitionist; 
that is, it supports the position that humans should “free” sheep and cease using them for 
resources or for research. This abolitionist stance, however, does not obviously follow from the 
facts about sheep psychology that M&M illuminate. Abolitionism is particularly problematic given 
that domestic sheep exist because of human artificial selection. Horback (2019) illustrates an 
alternative conclusion, namely, that sheep need human intervention because they are a 
domesticated species: that it is arguably unethical to “re-wild” them and certainly unethical to 
simply set them free when some breeds need human intervention. An abolitionist stance thus 
requires much more argument and defense.   
 If M&M intended to defend a more moderate position — one that minimizes the infliction 
of unjustifiable suffering on sentient beings — more could have been done in the review to define 
what it means to mistreat sheep given what is known of sheep’s abilities.  That is, what constitutes 
minimal justifiable suffering? M&M do not take a clear stance on the more challenging moral 
questions: Would it be morally permissible under certain levels of care and minimization of 
suffering to use sheep for wool, milk, meat or scientific research?  What extent of suffering might 
be morally acceptable? How does our knowledge of sheep psychological complexity help us 
determine the conditions under which sheep suffer in indefensible ways? The answers to these 
questions are often difficult. There is room for reasonable disagreement, and the morally relevant 
factors of specific cases require analysis. For example, there is no way to minimize suffering in 
industrial farming where most attention is paid to minimizing cost and maximizing output.  But in 
a system where sheep that live their lives on small-scale farms where they are known individually 
and habituated to being handled, one could argue that suffering is minimized enough for use of 
their wool and milk. But what about the use for leather and meat? 
 M&M also claim that psychological complexity is the capacity upon which the moral status 
of sheep rests. We would second Browning’s (2019) and Palmer & Sandøe’s (2019) point that 
none of the leading theories in animal ethics rest their case on psychological complexity or 
intelligence. To do so would be to endorse an anthropocentric picture that animal ethics as a field 
has sought to discredit. Instead, the minimal capacity that matters to most ethicists is sentience, 
defined as the ability to experience pleasure or pain, or as Regan (1983, p. 243) put it: having an 
experiential life that can go well or badly.   
 As Vonk (2019) and Horback (2019) also point out, the focus on complexity is incoherent 
given the critique of anthropocentrism M&M try to make: frustratingly, M&M allude to the 
morally relevant capacities of sheep through comparisons to taxa that are putatively given higher 
moral regard because of their intelligence, such as primates. But even if sheep were in fact 
“simple” and obedient, this would in no way entail that it was permissible to harm them, just as 
the varying mental capacities of other human beings have no relevance for whether we are 
morally obligated not to harm them (Singer, 2015).  This is a crucial point in the case for the moral 
status of animals. 
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 Another questionable assumption is one that is widely made in areas of environmental 
ethics and animal ethics, and has been made by several other commentators on this target article 
(Baker, 2019; Davis, 2019; Palmer & Sandøe, 2019). M&M claim that they are challenging a view 
— that sheep are “less” than other animals — which allows people to “psychologically distance” 
themselves from the animals they use for resources. If the source of cruelty to animals lies in the 
false or even self-deceptive belief that humans have no moral obligations to animals or the rest 
of nature because they are “lower,” then the solution to the problem lies in correcting this belief. 
Whether humans are more likely to treat animals better if they come to reject the scala naturae, 
however, is an empirical claim about human psychology and behavior that we cannot yet support 
on the basis of evidence. Moreover, there are prima facie reasons to be skeptical:   
 Humans have strong material interests in the resources sheep offer. This is probably the 
major reason they were domesticated in the first place — and the reason factory farming exists 
today. Of course, having a strong material interest may also mean that there is a strong interest 
in rejecting moral arguments and in “rationalizing” bad behavior. But humans are also cruel to 
other humans, and there is a general problem that humans often fail to do what they consider to 
be morally right. This is not at all to suggest that anthropocentrism is correct, or that challenging 
it is not at least an important part of what it will take to bring human-animal relationships into an 
ethically justifiable state. But M&M’s critique is not sensitive enough to the more complex 
institutional, psychological, and economic factors that contribute to the use of animals for the 
sake of humans. Seen in this light, the fact that sheep are viewed as “obedient, passive, and 
uniform” may not play a decisive role in our best psychological explanation of why they are 
mistreated. 
 To be clear, we agree that domesticated animals are treated abhorrently in mass farming 
practices and in some areas of research, that this mistreatment arises in part through 
psychological-cognitive mechanisms that will be difficult to overcome, and that much could be 
done to improve domestic animals’ lives. However, M&M’s target article largely bypasses the hard 
questions and misses an opportunity to specify more concretely what it means to mistreat sheep.  
Drawing out the ethical implications of scientific work on animal cognition and psychology 
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